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INTRODUCTION
Appellees respectfully submit this Petition for Rehearing
pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
because Appellees believe that when this.Court filed its
October 26, 1990 Opinion (hereafter -Opinion-) (attached hereto as
Addendum "A") in this case, this Court either overlooked or
misapprehended certain points of controlling case law and
unequivocal expressions of legislative intent contained in recent
statutory amendments.

This Court should grant the Petition for

Rehearing in this particular case because the Opinion is based
exclusively upon this Court's recent decision of Projects
Unlimited, Inc. v. Copper State Thrift & Loan Co., 142 Utah Adv.
Rep. 7 (Utah 1990), which was filed on September 6, 1990, the same
day this Court heard oral argument in this case.

(Copy of

Projects Unlimited attached hereto as Addendum -B H ).

Because this

Court's Projects Unlimited decision did not exist until after the
parties had already briefed and argued this matter, neither party
had an opportunity to analyze and address the application of the
Projects Unlimited rationale to this case.
Appellees recognize that on October 17, 1990 this Court
denied the September 20, 1990 Petition for Rehearing filed in the
Projects Unlimited case.

However, a review of that Petition

reveals that no legal arguments were directed towards the merits
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of the jurat issues raised therein, particularly the requirements
of §46-1-1, £t seq. Utah Code Ann. and the applicability of the
doctrine of substantial compliance.

Appellees genuinely believe

that the issues raised herein have not been fully considered by
this Court in the Projects Unlimited case or in this case. For
the reasons set forth below, this Court should afford Appellees an
opportunity to argue the merits or lack of merits in applying the
Projects Unlimited rationale here.
SUMMARY QF ARfflJMgNT
This Court should rehear argument in this case because
this Court's exclusive reliance upon the Projects Unlimited
decision effectively deprived Appellees of their opportunity to
analyze the rationale of the Projects Unlimited decision to
address that case in its briefs and argument.

In addition, there

are a number of legal and policy arguments not raised in the
Projects Unlimited case which this Court should further consider
before it determines to excuse some express statutory requirements
while requiring strict compliance with others.

The Projects

Unlimited decision, and therefore the decision in this case, is
flawed because statutory expressions of intent, through amendments
to the Mechanics Lien Act and through the enactment of the
Notaries Public Reform Act, make clear that lien notices must
contain a jurat which completely conforms to the statutorily
required elements.
-2-

Although this Court did not express any intent to do so
in either this or in the Projects Unlimited case, the holding of
these cases effectively overrules a line of important Utah
decisions.

The historical application of the doctrine of

substantial compliance has been to cure an inadequate or
incomplete attempt at meeting a statutory requirement.

This

Court's expansive application of the doctrine of substantial
compliance in this case and in Projects Unlimited is a departure
from this Court's historical practice, and now constitutes a rule
of law permitting the complete absence of a required statutory
element to be ignored.
Appellees do not believe that this Court intended to
overrule prior case law, ignore legislative intent, or create a
new rule of law.

This Court should grant this Petition for

Rehearing to have the benefit of having these concerns addressed
and to be fully advised of all ramifications of following and
supporting the Projects Unlimited decision.

APgUMENT
I.

THIS COURT'S COMPLETE RELIANCE ON THE PROJECTS UNLIMITED
DECISION TO ANSWER THE QUESTION CERTIFIED BY THE U.S. DISTRICT
COURT PREJUDICES APPELLEES AND FOLLOWS RATIONALE WHICH OUGHT
TO BE RECONSIDERED.
On September 6, 1990 this Court heard oral argument in

this case on the question of whether, in 1984, the absence of the
notary's place of residence from a jurat is fatal to the validity

-3-

of the mechanic's lien upon which the jurat appears.

Unbeknownst

to Appellees and on that same date, this Court handed down its
decision in Projects Unlimited, which effectively answered the
federal court's certified question.

Not surprisingly, on

October 26, 1990, this Court filed its decision in this case
stating its ruling in three sentences that the Projects Unlimited
decision was controlling.
The unfortunate coincidence of the Projects Unlimited
decision's being announced at the same time Appellees were
presenting their oral argument to this Court has effectively
deprived Appellees of their ability to brief and argue the
controlling, precedential law to this Court.

Upon a closer

analysis of the Projects Unlimited decision and the underlying
parties' briefs filed therein, Appellees believe that there are
significant legal issues not raised in that case which should have
been considered.

Further, Appellees believe that there are

practical consequences to this Court's decisions here and in
Projects Unlimited which this Court did not address, nor intend.
For the following reasons this Court should grant Appellee's
petition for rehearing and allow Appellees an opportunity to
highlight for this Court the difficulties of Projects Unlimited
and its likely progeny.
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II. THIS COURT OVERLOOKED OR MISAPPREHENDED IMPORTANT LEGISLATIVE
AMENDMENTS WHICH AROSE AFTER BRIEFING IN PROJECTS UNLIMITED
WAS COMPLETED.
In Projects Unlimited, this Court recognized that
mechanics liens are "purely statutory/ and lien claimants may only
acquire a lien by complying with the statutory provisions
authorizing them.-

142 Utah Adv. Rep. at 9 (citation omitted).

Yet this Court ruled that the complete omission of the statutorily
required element of the notary's place of residence will have no
effect on the validity of the lien by operation of the doctrine of
substantial compliance.

This particular application of the

doctrine of substantial compliance departs from established case
law.
A.

The Utah Legislature's Intent In 1984 And Presently Is
That Mechanics Liens Be Acknowledged In Accordance With
Utah Code Ann. §46-1-1 fit seq.
A recent amendment to the mechanics lien law makes clear

that in 1984, the legislature desired all mechanic's liens to
contain a jurat in conformance with §46-1-1, fit seq.

The

mechanics lien at issue here was recorded on June 4, 1984. The
applicable mechanics lien statute at that time, Utah Code Ann.
§38-1-7 (Supp. 1983), stated that every notice of lien "must be
verified by the oath of [the lien claimant] or of some other
person."

This Court held last year that a valid verification

requires, among other things, a "proper jurat."
CraiQCo, Inc., 767 P.2d 561, 564 (Utah 1989).
-5-

Mickelsen v.

As this Court noted in Projects Unlimited, 142 Utah Adv.
Rep. at 9 n.4, the Utah Legislature amended the mechanics lien
statute in 1985 in an apparent attempt to simplify lien notices by
removing the requirement of verification# and therefore of the
jurat.

However, the legislature apparently recognized the need

for a proper jurat because, as this Court further noted in
Projects Unlimited, the statute was amended again in 1989,
reinstating the requirement that a notice of lien contain a jurat.
In 1989, the legislature amended the mechanic's lien
statute to specifically provide a particular jurat form.
The current statute requires Man acknowledgment or
certificate as required under Chapter 3, Title 57.M Utah
Code Ann. §38-1-7(2)(e) (Supp. 1990).
Id. at 9, n.8 (emphasis added).

The "particular jurat formH

referenced in §57-3-1 Utah Code Ann. (1989) is the form contained
in §46-1-1, fit seq. Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1990).

That statute has

consistently required the notary to affix his residence or
location with the jurat.
1.

The Projects Unlimited case did not take into
account the legislature's expression that
pre-April 29, 1985 liens contain a conforming jurat.

This Court quoted at length from the new, amended section
38-1-7(2) Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1990) in footnote 2 to the
Projects Unlimited decision with one notable and critical
exception —

this Court made no mention of the fact that the

legislature expressed its intent that all liens prior to April 29,
1985 and after April 24, 1989 be acknowledged with the particular
jurat form contained in §46-1-1, fit seq. Utah Code Ann.
-6-

The actual language appearing in the statute and
apparently not considered by this Court is as follows:
This notice shall contain a statement setting forth
the following information:
• • •

(e) the signature of the lien claimant or his
authorized agent and an acknowledgement or certificate as
required under Chapter 3, Title 57. No acknowledgment or
certificate is required for any notice filed after
April 29, 1985, and before April 24, 1989.
§38-1-7(2)(e) Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1990).

The necessary

implication of this subsection is that the legislature intended
all liens recorded prior to the 1985 amendment to be acknowledged
under §57-3-1 Utah Code Ann. (1990).

That statute now reads, in

(2) Notarial acts affecting real property in this
state shall algp hs. performed in conformance with
Chapter 1, Title 46.
(Emphasis added.)

The legislative intent of §57-3-1 is clear.

To

be recorded, a document must be acknowledged, and any notarial act
must be in conformance with the Notary Public Act, which expressly
required, at least in 1984, the "place of residence" of the notary.
B.

The Legislature's Recent Enactment of the Notaries Public
Reform Act Did Not Relax The "Place Of Residence"
Requirement, But Rather Magnified The Requirement By
Compelling More Specificity.
The 1988 enactment of the Notaries Public Reform Act

heightened the place of residence requirements for jurats.

In

1984, §46-1-8 Utah Code Ann. (1953) stated as follows:
To all acknowledgments, oaths, affirmations and
instruments of every kind taken and certified by a notary
-7-

public he shall affix to his signature his official title
and his place of residence and the date on which his
commission expires.
In 1988, the Utah legislature repealed former §46-1-1 to 46-1-10
Utah Code Ann. (1953), and enacted the Notaries Public Reform Act,
codified as §46-1-1 to §46-1-17 Utah Code Ann. (1988).

This

repeal and amendment gave the legislature an opportunity to
reconsider the technical requirements of jurats and relax those
requirements if it desired to do so.

However, rather than relax

the requirements of a jurat the legislature chose to require more
specificity.

Section 46-1-13 Utah Code Ann. now requires all

notaries to obtain a notarial seal which "shall" include "the
address of the notary's business or residence."
§46-1-13(3)(a)(iii) Utah Code Ann. (1988).

Further amendments

were made to the Notaries Public Reform Act effective July 1,
1990, which amendments perpetuated the "address" requirements of
§46-1-13(3)(a)(iii) Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1990) and added more
requirements for the notarial seal. £££# e.g. §46-1-13(3)(a)(iv)
Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1990).
Changing the notary statutes to require the notary's
"address" necessarily implies two important concepts.

First, the

legislature looked at and considered the address requirements of
the previous statutes and determined to retain that requirement.
Second, and equally important, the legislature chose not to
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perpetuate the general "place of residence" requirement and
elected to enhance the requirement by calling for the more
specific "address" of the notary.
C.

The 1989 Amendment To The Mechanics Lien Statute And The
1988 Enactment Of The Notaries Public Reform Act Make
Clear The Legislature's Intent Regarding Jurats And What
Must Be Contained In Them.
This Court's decision in Projects Unlimited overlooked or

misapprehended the expressions of legislative intent described
above.

These significant changes were not and could not be called

to this Court's attention by the parties in the Projects Unlimited
case.

And because this Court felt itself bound by Projects

Unlimited, Appellees suggest that the Court overlooked or
misapprehended important arguments in favor of requiring
compliance with the jurat requirements.
In Projects Unlimited, this Court cited to a 1975 Oregon
Supreme Court decision for the proposition that the modern trend
is to "dispense with arbitrary rules which have no demonstrable
value in a particular fact situation."

142 Utah Adv. Rep. at 9

(quoting Consolidated Elec. Distribs.. Inc. v. Jepson Elec.
Contracting, Inc., 537 P.2d 80, 83 (Or. 1975)).

This Court then

went on to state that Utah has "followed this trend both in the
legislature and in the courts", pointing to the 1985 amendment to
the mechanics lien law which removed the verification
requirement.

Id.
-9-

The difficulty with the above proposition that the
legislature is relaxing lien content requirements is that it
ignores the more recent expressions of the legislature reinstating
the jurat requirements for liens and mandating more specificity
for jurat content.

The recent amendments identified above

expressly rebut the proposition implied in Projects Unlimited that
a lien's jurat is a "cumbersome" requirement needing only
substantial compliance.

While lien "content" requirements may be

undergoing a gradual legislative simplification process, the jurat
requirements for mechanic's liens have become more/ not less
exacting in recent years.
III. THIS COURT'S EXPANSIVE APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF
SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE IN THIS CASE AND IN PROJECTS UNLIMITED
CREATES INCONSISTENCIES WITH PRIOR DECISIONS.
This Court's application of the doctrine of substantial
compliance expands upon and effectively unsettles the rules
applicable to mechanic's liens.
A.

PrpjectS Unlimited Renders MicKelsen And Baker
Meaningless.
This Court recently settled the question of what

constitutes a valid verification in Mickelsen v. Craiaco. Inc..
767 P.2d 561 (Utah 1989).
We adopt as our rule that for a valid verification/
(1) there must be a correct written oath or
affirmation, and (2) it must be signed by the
affiant in the presence of a notary or other person
authorized to take oaths, and (3) the latter must
affix a proper jurat.
-10-

Id. at 564 (emphasis added).

In an earlier decision, expressly

reaffirmed by the Mickelsen court, this Court stated that "A
notary public who signs a jurat must comply with All fif the
requirements &f U.C.A., 1953, §46-1-1,fit£fig."

PaKer v,

Schwendiman, 714 P.2d 675, 677 (Utah 1986) (emphasis added).
This Court has consistently held that what constitutes a
••proper jurat" is a statutory matter, and Utah statutory law in
effect at the time of the notice of lien in the instant case
provided that a notary must affix "his place of residence" to all
instruments certified.

Yet this Court departed from its well

settled policy and stated in Projects Unlimited that "substantial
compliance would certainly be sufficient to satisfy [the jurat]
requirement."

142 Utah Adv. Rep. at 10.

The rules of law expressed in Mickelsen and Baker are
irreconcilable with the result in Projects Unlimited.

In Projects

Unlimited, the jurat contained only two of the four requirements
in effect then.

Only the signature and official title appeared,

while the place of residence and date of commission expiration
were absent.

Projects Unlimited's application of the doctrine of

substantial compliance to excuse the complete absence of 50% of
the statutorily required elements of a jurat renders the proper
jurat requirements of Mickelsen and Baker meaningless.

It also

renders meaningless the express statutory imperative regarding the
contents of jurats.

To reaffirm Projects Unlimited by following
-11-

it in this case calls into question the validity of Mickelsen and
certainly overrules the expression of law in Baker,

This cannot

have been the intent of this Court.
B.

The Doctrine Of Substantial Compliance Should Not Be Used
To Excuse The Complete Absence Of A Statutorily Required
Element.
Other applications of the doctrine of substantial

compliance by this Court demonstrate that while substantial
compliance may be applied to cure an attempt at meeting a
statutory requirement, the doctrine cannot be used to fill a
void.

Before considering prior applications, this Court should

have in mind that the Mickelsen decision expressly reaffirmed the
holdings of First Security Mortgage Co. v. Hansen, 631 P.2d 919
(Utah 1981), Graff v. Boise Cascade Corp.. 660 P.2d 721 (Utah
1983) and Baker v. Schwendiman. 714 P.2d 675 (Utah 1986).

767

P.2d at 564.
In the First Security case, the lien holder made the
claim that the corporate acknowledgement contained in the lien
substantially complied with the verification requirements.

The

lienholder also claimed that to invalidate the lien on the basis
of an incorrect verification would be a "mere hypertechnicality.H
631 P.2d at 921.

Responding to this claim, this Court held:

Our statute leaves no room for doubt as to the
requirement of a verified notice of claim, and this Court
in Eccles Lumber Co. v. Martin, 31 Utah 241, 87 P. 713
(1906), stated that since a mechanic's lien is statutory
and not contractual, a lien cannot be acquired unless the
claimant complies with the statutory provisions.
-12-

•

• • •

In view of this holding, defendant's argument that
it was nevertheless in substantial compliance with the
lien statute is unavailing.
Id. at 922. Under First Security, the complete failure to comply
with statutory provisions prevents the creation of a lien, and
this complete absence of a verification cannot be cured by
application of the doctrine of substantial compliance.
Perhaps the case most on point is Graff v. Boise Cascade
Corp., 660 P.2d 721 (Utah 1983).

In that case, the verification

form was present, and only one of its elements was absent.
Specifically, Mthe verification was complete except for the fact
that the lien claimant's signature appear[ed] on the wrong line."
660 P.2d at 722.

This Court rejected the application of the

doctrine of substantial compliance in the absence of an essential
element to the verification.

Ifl. at 723.

In Graff, the absence

of one statutory element was fatal to the lien.

This contrasts to

the Projects Unlimited holding that the absence of two statutorily
required elements was not fatal to the lien.
The Projects Unlimited decision calls into question the
continuing validity and applicability of Mickelsen. Baker. First
Security and Graff.

Appellees respectfully submit that this Court

has misapprehended the substantial compliance doctrine in Projects
Unlimited and in this case.

In both cases there was na

compliance—substantial or otherwise—with the requirement that
the notary provide Hhis place of residence."
-13-

Appellees respectfully submit that before overruling or
seriously undermining this important line of Utah Supreme Court
cases, the Court should grant the Petition for Rehearing, so that
the soundness of the Projects Unlimited decision and its
application in the present instance may be more thoroughly
examined and tested.
IV.

DOCTRINES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION FAVOR REHEARING.
In a recent decision, this Court set forth the rule of

law regarding unambiguous expressions of legislative intent.
When the language of a particular provision of a
statute is ambiguous, the Court may attempt, following
principles of statutory construction, to ascertain the
intention of the Legislature; but where there is no
ambiguity the plain language of the statute must be taken

as the. expression of the legislature's intent *

P.I.E. Employees Federal Credit Union v. Bass, 759 P.2d 1144, 1151
(Utah 1988).

There is nothing ambiguous about the legislature's

desire that liens contain jurats, and that the jurats contain some
description of the notary's address.

Regardless of this Court's

or anyone else's questions regarding the wisdom or policy reasons
for such requirements, this Court has consistently honored
legislative intent by recognizing that the cure for any harshness
resulting from, or antiquity inherent in such requirements is a
matter for the legislature.
[W]e cannot eliminate those antiquated and apparently
unnecessary statutory formalities and bring consistency
and clarity to this area by judicial fiat.
. . . .

-14-

[A] complete remedy for the problems created by these
statutes would be the legislature's enactment of a law
repealing technical swearing requirements in all statutes
and substituting the simple requirement that the
documents or statements in question by signed or made
under penalty of perjury.
• • • •

It would be most unfortunate if our action today served
only to postpone a truly effective and thoroughgoing
legislative remedy.
Mickelsen, 767 P.2d at 565-6 (Zimmerman, J. concurring).

Contrary

to this Court's historical reticence to amend law by jurdicial
fiat, this Court's decision in Projects Unlimited and consequently
in this case overlooked and/or misapprehended the clear
expressions of legislative intent in recent amendments, and
implicitly overruled the clear, unambiguous rulings in other jurat
and mecanic's lien cases
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Appellee respectfully requests
that this Court grant their Petition for Rehearing.
DATED this tf* ' day of November, 1990.
Respectfully Submitted,

Mark 0. M6rr
Brent D. Wride
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellees
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CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

I certify that the foregoing PETITION FOR REHEARING is
filed in good faith and aot for the purpose of delay.
DATED this

^7

day of November, 1990.
Respectfully Submitted/

Mark O. Morris
Brent D. Wride
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellees
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the

day of November, 1990,

four copies of the foregoing APPELLEE'S PETITION OF REHEARING were
mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
J. Keith Henderson
8 East Broadway, Suite 735
Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

OCT 2 9 1930
& NEBLKrR
This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacyfie Reporter.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

r\.-, ..
U ^ ** f*% r- • {•
^VJ/V / 7 ^ Q £

ooOooJohn Garrett, dba Garrett
Drywall,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

No. 890494
FILED
October 26, 1990

v.
Kenneth Rushton, Trustee,
First American Savings Bank,
F.S.B., North Carolina, FSLIC as
receiver, American Federal Savings
and Loan Association, Anderson,
Indiana, Trustee,
Defendants and Appellees.

Attorneys:

Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk

J- Keith Henderson, Salt Lake City, for Garrett
Mark 0. Morris, Brent D. Wride, Salt Lake City,
for First American & FSLIC,
Kenneth A. Rushton, Salt Lake City, for himself

On Certification from the United States District Court
for the District of Utah, The Honorable Bruce S. Jenkins
STEWART. Justice:
This case is here on a question of law certified by
the United States District Court for the District of Utah. The
question certified is: "[I]is a notice of lien placed of
record lacking the place of residence of a notary, but
otherwise complete . . . , void under Utah law?"
John Garrett, dba Garrett Drywall, filed a notice of
lien to secure payment of money due for drywall work performed
during the construction of the Brianhead Hotel in Brianhead,
Iron County, Utah, The entities that constructed the Brianhead
Hotel and the Brianhead Hotel Corporation filed bankruptcy
petitions in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Utah, Central Division. Pursuant to bankruptcy
court approval, the Brianhead Hotel was sold subject to liens
against the property on the date of sale. The appellees, the
beneficial interest holders of a trust deed secured by the

proceeds of the sale, challenged the validity of Garrett's lien
on the ground that the notary failed to include his place of
residence under his name on the jurat, as required by Utah Code
Ann. § 46-1-8 (1981) (currently § 46-1-13 (Supp. 1990)).
All other statutory requirements for a valid jurat were met.
The bankruptcy court held that a proper jurat must
show "the county of residence of the notary public" and that
the absence of that "essential element of a . . . jurat is not
substantial compliance" under Utah law. On that basis, the
bankruptcy court held that Garrett did not have a valid lien.
That ruling was appealed to the United States District Court,
and Chief Judge Jenkins certified the issue of the correctness
of that ruling to this Court for resolution.
The precise question posed by the district court was

recently addressed in Projects Unlimited, Inc, v> Copper State
Thrift & Loan Co., 142 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (Utah 1990). This
Court held that the failure of a notary to affix the notary's
place of residence to the jurat did not invalidate a mechanic's
lien under either the mechanic's lien statute or the notary
public statute. Accordingly, we hold that there was
substantial compliance with Utah Code Ann. § 46-1-8 (1981) and
that Garrett's lien is not invalid because of the absence of
the notary's place of residence from the jurat.

WE CONCUR:

Gordon R. Hall, Chie f Justice

Richard C. Howe,r Associate
Chief Justice

Christine M. Durham, Justice

Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice
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IN T H E SUPREME COURT
OF T H E STATE OF U T A H
PROJECTS UNLIMITED, INC., a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
COPPER STATE THRIFT & LOAN CO.,
Valley Bank
£ Trust Co., Cottonwood Thrift £ Loan Co.,
Western Savings & Loan Co., Bradshaw
Development Co., et al.,
Defendants and Appellees.
No. 160340
FILED: September 6, 1990
Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Judith M. Billings

1. FACTS
Bradshaw Development Company, Inc.
("Bradshaw"), owned a parcel of land, the
Highland Orchards property, which it planned
to develop into the Highland Orchards Condominium project. The pioperty was divided
into two parcels with the objective of constructing condominiums in two phases-phase
I and phase II. Phase I, when completed,
would consist of eighteen condominium units.
Bradshaw engaged Projects Unlimited, Inc.
("Projects"), to construct some of the phase I
units. In September 1982, Bradshaw and
Projects entered into a contract for the construction of two units-FF-6-Al and FF6-B1, hereinafter referred to as units 1 and 2.
Those parties entered into a second contract in
April 1983 concerning the contraction of six
additional u n i t s - F F - 5 - A l , FF-5-B1,
F F - 1 1 - A 1 , F F - 1 1 - A 2 , F F - l l - B l , and
FF-11-B2, hereinafter referred to as units 3
through 8, respectively. The contracts allocated prices on a per-unit basis.
Copper State Thrift & Loan Company financed construction of the eight units. The
Copper State loan to Bradshaw was secured by
two trust deeds. The first deed was recorded in
December 1982 and covered units 1 and 2. The
second deed was recorded in June 1983 and
covered units 3 through 8.
Relying on the terms of its loan agreement
with Bradshaw, Copper State refused to
advance additional funds to Bradshaw in June
1983. Sometime thereafter, Bradshaw stopped
making payments to Projects. On October 7,
1983, Projects ceased construction with a
substantial balance still owing to Projects.
Bradshaw did not record its condominium
declaration until August 1983.
During construction, units 1, 2, and 3 were
sold. The sales of units 1 and 2 were financed
by Valley Bank & Trust Company, which
recorded trust deeds on those units in May
1983. Copper State subordinated its December
1982 trust deed to the May 1983 trust deeds of
Valley Bank. The sale of unit 3 was financed
by Western Savings £ Loan Company, which
is not a party to this appeal. After construction was halted, units 4 and 5 were sold. The
sales of these units were financed by Cottonwood Thrift £ Loan Company and secured by
trust deeds recorded in December 1983.
In November 1983, Projects recorded a
notice of mechanic's lien against the Highland
Orchards property. The notice described Bradshaw as the owner of the subject property.
The lien notice described the property by a
metes and bounds description including all of
the phase 1 and phase II property.1 The notice
did not describe the eight constructed units, by
employing tbeir descriptions as used in the
condominium declaration or otherwise, nor
did it allocate unpaid amounts attributable to
each unit. The notice did not distinguish
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ORME, Coort of Appeals Jadge:
Projects Unlimited, Inc., appeals from a
summary judgment invalidating its mechanic's
lien against the interests of Copper State
Thrift & Loan Company, Valley Bank & Trust
Company, and Cottonwood Thrift ft Loan
Company, Inc. We affirm the summary judgment as to Cottonwood Thrift, but reverse as
to Copper State and Valley Bank.
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between work performed under the September
1982 and April 1983 contracts. The notice of
lien cited the construction starting date as
October 10, 1982, and the ending date as
October 7, 1983. Although the notice of lien
contained the signature and seal of a notary
and the date of notarization, it did not give
the notary's address or commission expiration
date.
Bradshaw and Projects negotiated to release
from the lien units 4 and 5, financed by Cottonwood Thrift. The lien release specifically
stated that units 4 and 5 were released from
the scope of the lien in exchange for the
payment of $90,000. Thereafter, Projects filed
an amended notice of lien. The amended
notice was essentially identical to the initial
notice except that $85,000 was added to the
'credits and offsets" figure and subtracted
from the 'balance owing" figure. The same
metes and bounds description was used to
describe the property. The amended notice did
not exempt units 4 and 5 from the property
description, but attached to it were a map of
the entire condominium project and a copy of
the partial release.
Projects commenced an action to foreclose
the lien and recorded a lis pendens in March
1984. The complaint alleged that Bradshaw
had breached its contracts with Projects. The
complaint also called for a determination of
priorities among the various claimants. Valley
Bank was not named as a defendant in the
complaint but had actual knowledge of the
action at least by August 1984, when it reviewed a title report showing Projects' lis
pendens and initiated relevant correspondence
with Projects. On May 24, 1985, almost
twenty months after it ceased construction,
Projects filed an amended complaint which
joined Valley Bank and others as defendants.
Bradshaw failed to answer either complaint,
and a default judgment was entered against it
in December 1985.
Copper State, Cottonwood Thrift, Valley
Bank, and Western Savings ('the Banks")
moved for summary judgment on the remaining claims. They collectively argued that
Projects* lien was invalid under the mechanic's Hen statute and under the Condominium Ownership Act. Essentially, their arguments under the mechanic's lien statute were
that (1) the jurat lacked the notary's address
and the date her commission expired, (2) the
notice describes more property than was actually subject to the hen, (3) the notice describes property which Bradshaw initially did not
own, and (4) the lien did not distinguish
between work performed under the September
1982 and April 1983 contracts. The Banks also
argued that the Condominium Ownership Act
required Projects to file a separate lien on
each condominium unit as described in the
condominium declaration.
Valley Bank also argued that Projects had
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failed to join it as a defendant within the
statutorily prescribed time and was therefore
barred from later amending its complaint to
add that bank as a defendant. Moreover,
Cottonwood Thrift argued that it was not a
proper party to the suit because Projects had
released the units it financed from the scope
of the lien. Projects filed a cross-motion for
partial summary judgment on its claim against
Copper State, its construction lender.
The trial court granted the Banks' summary
judgment motions and denied Projects*
motion. The court concluded that (1) Projects
had unequivocally released from the lien's
coverage the units financed by Cottonwood
Thrift, (2) Projects failed to join Valley Bank
as a party within the required time, and (3) the
lien was invalid due to improper notarization
•and on grounds otherwise set forth in the
moving defendants' memoranda on file/
On appeal, Projects challenges each of the
trial court's conclusions. Primarily, it argues
that Utah does not require a lien notarization
to contain the notary's address and/or
commission expiration date.
The Banks assert the same arguments on
appeal that they asserted in the trial court. In
particular, they argue that we should affirm
the trial court's decision on the notarization
issue. Moreover, the Banks assert that, even
assuming we were to agree with Projects on
the notarization issue, we can and should
affirm the summary judgment due to other
failures in the lien notice. And indeed, "we
may affirm trial court decisions on any proper
ground(s), despite the trial court's having
assigned another reason for its ruling." Buehner
Block Co. v. UWC Assocs.. 752 P.2d
892, 895 (Utah 1988); see a/so Stare v. One
1979 Pontile Trans Am, 771 P.2d 682, 684
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). The Banks also crossappeal, seeking an award of attorney fees in
the district court and on appeal.
D. STANDARD OF REVIEW
'Summary judgment is proper only when no
genuine issue of material fact exists and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law." TnmsMmaic* Cash Reserve,
Inc. v. Dixie Power St Water, Inc., 789 P.2d
24, 25 (Utah 1990); me Utah R. Gv. P. 56(c).
In our determination of whether the trial court
properly granted summary judgment, we must
review the facts in the light most favorable to
the losing party. E.g.% Ron Case Roofing St
Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d
1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). Moreover, we review
the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness and give no particular deference to that
court's view of the law. Id.
HI. MECHANIC'S LIENS GENERALLY
We begin our analysis by recognizing that
"|t)he purpose of the mechanic's ben act is
remedial in nature and seeks to provide prot-

UTAB ADVANCE UPORTS

CODE • co

Projects Unlimited v. Copper Sute Thrift

0

dv. RCP. 7
_Z
We must determine whether the rigorous interpretations urged by the Banks are necessary
to protect the interests of the parties in the
instant situation. Unless we find that Projects'
alleged failures have compromised a purpose
of the mechanic's lien statute, those failures
will be viewed as technical, and in the absence
of any prejudice, we will uphold the lien.5

eaion to laborers and materialmen who have
added directiy to the value of the propeny of
another by their materials or labor/ Calder
Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922, 924
(Utah 1982). On the other hand, we recognize
that liens create "an encumbrance on propeny
that deprives the owner of his ability to
convey clear title and impairs his credit/ First
Sec. Mtg. Co. v. Hansen, 631 P.2d 919, 922
IV. INVALIDITY OF THE LIEN UNDER
(Utah 1981), a fact the imponance of which is
SECTIONS 3S-I-7 AND -S
magnified by the pre-recordation priority
Sections 38-1-7 and 38-1-8 of Utah's
accorded a valid mechanic's hen. See Utah
Code Ann. §38-1-5 (1988). Sute legislat- mechanic's lien statute identify the statutory
ures and courts attempt to balance these elements of a lien notice. At the time the
dispute arose, section 38-1-7 provided that
competing interests through their mechanic's
every notice of lien recorded with the county
lien statutes and judicial interpretations
recorder must contain
thereof.
a notice of intention to hold and
Mechanic's liens are purely statutory, and
claim a lien, and a statement of his
lien claimants may only acquire a lien by
demand after deducting all just
complying with the statutory provisions autcredits and offsets, with the name
horizing them. Utah Sav. & Loan Assoc, v.
of the reputed owner if known or if
Mecham, 12 Utah 2d 335, 338, 366 P.2d 598,
not known, the name of the record
600 (1961). However, Utah courts have recoowner, and also the name of the
gnized that substantial compliance with these
person by whom he was employed
provisions is all that is required.2 Chase v.
or to whom he furnished the matDawson, 117 Utah 295, 296, 215 P.2d 390,
erial, with a statement of the terms,
390 (1950); see also Graff v. Boise Cascade
time given and conditions of his
Corp., 660 P.2d 721, 722 (Utah 1983). Morecontract, specifying the time when
over, we have stated that "[a] lien once acquthe first and last labor was perfoired by labor performed on a building with the
rmed, or the first and last material
consent of the owner should not ... be defewas furnished, and also a descripated by technicalities, when no rights of others
tion of the property to be charged
are infringed, and no express command of the
with the lien, sufficient for identifstatute is disregarded/ Eccies Lumber Co. v.
ication, which claim must be veriMartin, 31 Utah 241, 249, 87 P. 713, 716
fied by the oath of himself or of
(1906) (quoting 20 Am. & Eng. Encyclopedia
some other person.
of Law 276); see also Mickclscn v. Craig co,
Inc., 767 P.2d 561, 563 (Utah 1989). Courts Utah Code Ann. §38-1-7 (Supp. 1983).*
from other states also subscribe to this view. Section 38-1-8 provided:
See, e.g., H.A.M.S. Co. v. Electrical ContrLiens against two or more buildings
actors of Alaska, Inc., 563 P.2d 258, 263
or
other improvements owned by
(Alaska 1977); Horseshoe Estates v. 2M Co.,
the same person may be included in
713 P.2d 776,781 (Wyo. 1986).
one claim; but in such case the
Although courts have differing opinions
person filing the claim must desigabout how liberally to construe provisions
nate the amount claimed to be due
within their mechanic's lien statutes, 'the
to him on each of such buildings or
modem trend is to dispense with arbitrary
other improvements.
rules which have no demonstrable value in a
particular fact situation/ 3 Consolidated Elec. Utah Code Ann. §38-1-8 (1988).
Distribs., Inc. v. Jepson Elec. Contracting,
A. Failare of Ike Jnrat
Inc., 272 Or. 376, 380, 537 P.2d 80, 83 (1975).
At the time the dispute arose, Utah Code
Utah has followed this trend both in the legi- Ann. §38-1-7 (Supp. 1983) provided that
slature and in the courts. A legislative example every notice of lien 'must be verified by the
of this trend is the 1985 amendment to section oath of (the lien claimant] or of some other
38-1-7 of the mechanic's lien statute. The person/ The district court found that a
1985 amendment greatly simplified the mech- proper verification under section 38-1-7
anic's lien notice, dispensing with several of required compliance with Utah Code Ann.
the more cumbersome lien notice requirem- §46-1-8 (19S3), which provided: *To all
ents.4 One judicial example of this trend is acknowledgments, oaths, affirmations and
Mickdsen, in which this court clarified the lien instruments of every kind taken and certified
verification process and dispensed with the by a notary public be shall affix to his signanotion that the claimant's verification requ- ture his official title and his place of residence
ired any formal ritual. 767 P.2d at 563.
and the date on which his commission
With these general principles in mind, we expires.9 The court then concluded that the
turn to the particular arguments in this case.
UTAH ADVANCE UPORTS
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notary's failure to include her address and
In this case, the jurat contained the notary's
commission expiration date in the jurat inva- signature, the date, and her official seal. These
lidated the verification, which made the lien items were sufficient to evidence the fact that
void. We disagree.
the document had been verified. Moreover,
Initially, we note that verification is an anyone who questioned the validity of the
essentia] part of a lien notice and 'not a notarization could certainly confirm its authhypertechnicality that we can discount.* First enticity with the simplest inquiry. Thus, we
Sec. Mtg. Co. v. Hansen, 631 P.2d 919. 922 find that the lien's notarization substantially
(Utah 1981).7 Verification by the lien claimant complied with the mechanic's lien and notary
was thought necessary so that "Iflrivolous, statutes. See, e.g., Georgia Lumber Co. v. Harunfounded, and inflated claims can thereby be rison Constr. Co., 103 W. Va. 1, 5, 136
minimized, and the prejudgment property S.E. 399, 401 (1927) (notice sufficient though
rights of the [property owners] receive their notary failed to affix official seal in contravdue protection." Id. Verification accomplishes ention of statute); Stern, 237 N.E.2d at 317this purpose by creating "the possibility of 19 (failure of notary to affix signature to jurat
perjury prosecution for verifying a false lien did not invalidate affidavit).
claim." H.A.M.S. Co. v. Electrical ContracThe purpose of the verification requirement
tors of Alaska, Inc., 563 P.2d 258, 264 is to assure that lien claimants file legitimate
(Alaska 1977) (lien must be signed by clai- claims. First Sec. Mtg., 631 IP.2d at 922; see
mant; corporate acknowledgment insufficient). also H.A.M.S., 563 P.2d at 264. In First
Although the 1983 mechanic's lien statute Security Mortgage and H.A.M.S., liens were
requires verification, Utah Code Ann. §38-1- held invalid because the lien notices did not
7 (Supp. 1983), it does not state any particular contain the signature of the claimants but
procedure for verification. Those procedures simply the signature of a notary attesting to
have developed judicially in cases like First the oath of the claimants. Unlike those cases,
Security Mortgage. One of the most recent the president of Projects signed an oath that
and instructive cases defining these procedures the contents of the hen notice were true and
is Mickelsen v. Craigco, Inc., 767 P.2d 561 the notary attested to this fact. We see no
(Utah 1989), decided after the trial court made policy reason why the notary's technical
its ruling in this case. In Mickelsen, we listed failure to include her address and commission
the essentia] elements for a proper verification: expiration date increased, in any way, the
"(1) [TJhere must be a correct written oath or likelihood that Projects would file a frivolous
affirmation, and (2) it must be signed by the claim, especially since her failure presumably
affiant in the presence of a notary or other occurred after the verification was signed by
person authorized to take oaths, and (3) the the president.
latter must affix a proper jurat." Id. at 564.
For the above reasons, we find that the lien
The Banks do not contest that an oath was notice substantially complied with the "proper
made or that it was signed before a notary. jurat" requirement established in Mickelsen.9
They simply argue that the notary failed to
B. Other Grouds
affix a "proper jurat" because she omitted her
Though we disagree with the trial court's
address and the expiration date of her comlegal conclusion on the notarization issue, we
mission.
The Banks would have us adopt a position may still affirm the summary judgment based
requiring strict compliance with the notary upon one of the other failures in the lien
public statute in order to satisfy the verifica- notice. The Banks argue that the lien notice is
tion requirement of the mechanic's lien statute invalid because the metes and bounds descrias expounded in Mickelsen. We decline to ption in the notice (1) covers more than one
adopt this position. A jurat is 'merely evid- condominium unit without specifically reference of the fact that the oath was properly encing each, (2) describes more property than
taken before the duly authorized officer." 50 is actually subject to the lien, and (3) describes
C.J.S. Jurat 705 (1947); aee also Stem v. property which was not initially owned by
Board of Elections, 14 Ohio St. 2d 175, 181, Bradshaw and because the notice fails to dis237 N.E.2d 313, 317 (1968); Craig v. State, tinguish between work completed under the
232 Ind. 293, 295, 112 N.EJd 296, 297 (1953) two separate contracts.
These other grounds essentially challenge the
(purpose is to evidence that oath was made
before authorized officer). In view of this descriptive contents of the hen notice. The
principle, because the jurat in this case dearly purpose for descriptive terms in a lien notice is
evidenced that the joath was given before a to adequately inform interested parties of the
aotary, it should be considered adequate. And existence and scope of the lien. See Park Gty
even assuming that the legislature intended the Meat Co. r. Coamock Silver Mining Co., 36
inclusion of a jurat which conformed with the Utah 145, 155, 103 P. 254, 260 (1906); Ecdes
aotary statute,1 substantia] compliance would Lumber Co. v. Martin, 31 Utah 241, 249, 87
certainly be sufficient to satisfy that require- P. 713, 717 (1906); see also Parsons v. Keeney,
ment. E.g., Chase v. Dawson, 117 Utah 295, 98 Conn. 745,749,120 A. 505, 507 (1923); Beall
Pipe A Tank Corp. v. Tumac Intenno296,215 P.2d 390,390 (1950).
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untain, Inc., 108 Idaho 487, 490, 700 P.2d lien claimants between and among themse109, 112 (Ct. App. 1985); Consolidated EJec. lves/ id.
The next case in which we discussed the
Distribs., Inc. v. Jepson Elec. Contracting,
inc., 272 Or. 376, 382, 537 P.2d 80, 82 (1975). issue was United States Building & Loan
Thus, courts look to see whether interested Association v. Midvale Home Finance Corp.,
parties have been informed of the existence of 86 Utah 506, 44 P.2d 1090 (1935). In Midvale
the lien and whether the lien has misled or Home, a corporation promoted the construcprejudiced those parties. See Eccles, 87 P. at tion and sale of homes in a subdivision. When
717; see also Ball, 700 P.2d at 112; Horse- the corporation defaulted on its construction
shoe Estates v. 2M Co., 713 P.2d 776, 781 loan, the loan company brought suit to fore(Wyo. 1986). When lien notices have suffici- close its mortgage on the subdivision property.
ently informed interested persons that a lien We were called upon to determine the prioriexists on identifiable property and the comp- ties among the mortgage, several mechanic's
laining party has not been misled by the liens, and the interests of the individual home
notice, the purpose of the provisions has not purchasers. The home purchasers argued that
been thwarted and courts are inclined to find they had priority over the lien claimants
substantia] compliance. See, e.g., Horseshoe, because the lien claimants did not allocate
amounts due on the various houses constru713P.2dat781.
As we analyze each of the Banks* challenges cted in the subdivision. The purchasers atteto the lien description, our main purpose is to mpted to distinguish Eccles on the basis that Ecdetermine whether the notice adequately inf- cles involved only the original owner. We
ormed the Banks of the existence of the lien rejected this argument, concluding that the
and whether the Banks were prejudiced, as a mechanic's liens 'attached before any of the
matter of law, by the descriptive terms. claims of the unit holders/ id. at 519, 44
'Absent any such claim of prejudice or being P.2datl096.
The final case in which we dealt with this
misled in any manner by the description[s]
which [appear] in the lien statement, we [will] subject was Utah Savings & Loan Association
v. Mecham, 12 Utah 2d 335, 366 P.2d 598
hold that it was sufficient. * id."
1. Inclusion Of More Than One Unit Without (1961). In Mecham, a claimant filed a hen
covering numerous subdivision lots. Some of
Designating Each
Section 38-1-7 provides, with our emph- the lots were owned by the Mechams, and
asis, that every notice of lien must contain "a some, by another individual. The hen failed to
description of the property to be charged with allocate the amounts due on each lot. Mecham
the lien, sufficient for identification." Utah argued that the hen was invalid. We affirmed
Code Ann. §38-1-7 (Supp. 1983). Section the genera] rules in Eccles and Midvale Home
38-1-8 provides in pertinent part: "Liens but concluded that the hen claimant could
against two or more buildings... owned by the only aggregate claims if the various lots and
same person or persons may be included in structures described in the hen were owned by
one claim; but in such case the person filing the same person.
As in Midvale Home, the Banks in this case
the claim must designate therein the amount
claimed to be due to him on each of such acquired their interests in the property subsebuildings." Utah Code Ann. §38-1-8 quent to the time the mechanic's hen atta(1988). The Banks argue that these two sect- ched. Unlike the situation in the Mecham case,
ions require Projects to allocate its contract Bradshaw was apparently the only owner of
claims among all the relevant condominium the affected property when the hen attached,
i.e., when construction started. Finally, the
units.
We begin our analysis with the first of three Banks do not argue that the hen misled them
cases dealing with section 38-1-8 and its as to the claimed hen, nor have they demonpredecessor. In Eccles Lumber Co. v. Martin, strated any prejudice from the aggregation of
31 Utah 241, 87 P. 713 (1906), the owner of the claims in this case. Thus, we hold that the
property on which a mechanic's lien had been lien notice was not invalid, at least as against
filed argued that a lien notice was invalid the Banks, simply because Projects failed to
because it failed to separately sute amounts segregate the contract amounts attributable to
due on different structures. This court const- individual condominium units.
rued the predecessor statute to section 38-1-1 2. Describing More Property Than Was
Subject To Uen
8, which contains language identical to that in
section 38-1-8, and definitively stated that a
The Banks argue that even if Projects was
blanket lien was not invalid for failing to all- not required to segregate the claims attributocate the amounts due. Eccles, 87 P. at 717. able to each condominium unit, the lien was
The hen claimant's failure did 'not affect nor invalid for describing more property than was
concern the owner of the property/ Id. He properly subject to the lien. However, the
was 'fairly informed of the amount claimed general rule is that the inclusion of
against his property.9 Id. Rather, allocation
more land than that to which the
was necessary 'to protect the interests of the
lien may properly attach does not
UTAH ADVANCE KEPOSTS
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another
person.
In
either
event,
the
court
can
vitiate the ben upon so much of the
determine what part of the property is actually
land as is encompassed within the
subject to the ben. Bcall Pipe A Tank Corp. v.
description and to which a lien may
Tumac Intermountain, Inc., 108 Idaho at 498,
properly attach, at least if the des700 P.2d at 112. Whether the other person
cription is not fraudulent or grossly
would have an action for slander of title is a
misleading and innocent third
separate matter. See supra note 11. Again, the
parties are not affected.
Annotation, Sufficiency of notice, churn, or Banks do not complain that they were actually
statement of Mechanic's lien with respect to misled or prejudiced by the notice. Thus,
description or location of real property, 52 under these facts, the overly expansive propA.L.R.2d 12, 83 (1957); see also Adams Tree erty description did not compromise any
Serv., Inc. v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 20 purpose of the statute and does not invalidate
Ariz. App. 214, 511 P.2d 658, 663 (1973) the ben as to the Banks.
(valid portion of hen can be severed from 4. Inclusion Of Separate Contracts la One
invalid portion); Bcall Pipe £ Tank Corp. v.
Lien
Tumac Intermountain, Inc., 108 Idaho 487,
The Banks also argue that the ben must fail
700 P.2d 109, 112 (Ct. App. 1985) ("the land because the construction work on the propeny
properly subject to the hen is for the court to was performed under two separate contracts.
determine"); Park City Meat Co. v. Comstock Although the Banks advance this argument,
Silver Mining Co., 36 Utah 145, 103 P. 254, they fail to cite much authority to support
259 (1909) ("court may limit the amount [of their position or to give any pobcy reasons for
land] to what may be necessary"); Horseshoe adopting such a rule. Utah courts have not
Estates v. 2M Co., 713 P.2d at 781 (ben which addressed this question before, and there is a
contained "no adequate description of the split of authority among other jurisdictions
property" upheld where no claim of prejudice which have considered it.
or being misled); Engle v. First Nat'l Bank,
Some courts have held that when work is
590 P.2d 826, 832 (Wyo. 1979) (vabdating ben performed under separate contracts, the work
which described entire ranch rather than small may not be aggregated into a single ben claim.
parcel upon which house was constructed since Rather, a separate notice must be recorded for
no showing of prejudice by bank).
each contract. See, e.g., F.A. Drew Glass Co. v.
We are persuaded that no purpose of the Eagle MiU, 1 Kan. App. 614, 42 P. 387, 390
mechanic's ben statute would be served by (1895); Schively v. RadeU, 227 Pa. 434, 441,
totally invalidating a ben which overdescribes 76 A. 209, 211 (1910). Other jurisdictions,
the property upon which the ben can properly however, have allowed ben claimants to file a
attach. There is no evidence in the record to single notice even though the work was perfsuggest that the description was fraudulent. ormed under more than one contract. See, e.g.,
Moreover, the Banks do not argue that they Fixture * Plumbing Co., 1311 Ala. 256, 31
were misled or prejudiced by tne description. So. 26, 28 (1901); Alabama State Fair £
Therefore, we cannot say, ns a matter of law, Agricultural Assfn v. Alabama Oas Booth v.
that the overly broad description results in the Pendola, 88 Cal. 36, 25 P. 1101, 1101 (1891);
ben's invalidity as to the Banks.11
Parsons v. Keeney, 98 Conn. 745, 749, 120 A.
505,
507 (1923); Saint Joseph's College v. Mor3. Describing Property Not Initially Owmed By
rison, Inc., 158 Ind. App. 272, 302
Bradshaw
The Banks argue that the description may N.E.2d 865, «74-76 (1973); Consolidated
have included property not even owned by Elec. Distrib., Inc. v. Jemon Bee. ContracBradshaw at the time the work was comme- ting, Inc., 272 Or. 376, 537 P.2d 80 (1975);
nced on the project. They argue, citing Fischer v. Meiroff, 192 Wis. 482, 494, 213
Mecham, that this fact alone invabdates the N.W. 283,285 (1927).
After reviewing the various cases, we find
ben. We do not think Mecham stands for this
proposition. In Mecham, we invalidated the more persuasive the cases which have allowed
Hen because 'the materials, for which daim the aggregation of claims arising under more
was made, were not furnished upon buildings than one contract. In Consolidated Electric,
owned by the same person or persons.9 12 one of the comparatively more recent cases,
Utah 2d at 339, 366 P.2d at 601 (emphasis the Oregon Supreme Court allowed a lien
added). Here, the Banks do not argue that any claimant to file a single lien notice covering
of the materials or labor went into the const- two contracts with separate owners. Although
ruction of buildings not initially owned by the court stated that it did not favor the praBradshaw but simply that tome of the land ctice, it noted that each owner was sufficiently
included in the notice was not owned by Bra- notified of the ben against its property and no
I 'prejudice (had] been suffered by the defendshaw at the outset of construction.
We fail to see much of a distinction for this dants in any material respect." 272 Or. at 383,
case between a ben which includes too much 537 P.2d at 83. The holding of Consolidated
property owned by the same owner and too Electric significantly departed from earlier
much property part of which is owned by Oregon case law. See, e.g., Dimitre Elec. Co.
I*

UTAH ADVA*

UPOftTS

CODE*co
Provo, Uub

Projects Unlimited v. Copper Slate Thrift
142 Uttfa

v. Paget, 175 Or. 72, 151 P.2d 630 (1*44). In
changing its position, the Oregon court recognized that "the modem trend [in mechanic's
hen law] is to dispense with arbitrary rules
which have no demonstrable value in a particular fact situation." Consolidated Elec. Dist.t
Inc., 272 Or. at 380, 537 P.2d at 82.
The reasoning in Consolidated Electric
makes sense, and we adopt that position in
this case. Again, the Banks do not argue that
the notice failed to adequately notify them of
the existence of the hen or in any way prejudiced them. Thus, we hold that the inclusion
of claims arising under two separate contracts
in a single hen notice did not invalidate Projects'ben.
5. Summary
The Banks do not seriously claim that any
of the alleged description failures misled or
prejudiced them. The lien notices, while not a
model of clarity and precision, appear to have
adequately accomplished the purposes of the
statute as concerns the Banks. Thus, we hold
that Projects' lien notice substantially complied with sections 38-1-7 and 38-1-8 of
the mechanic's lien statute. Accordingly, the
lien is valid, at least as between the parties to
this appeal.
V. INVALIDITY OF THE LIEN UNDER
SECTION 574-19
The Banks also argue that the lien notice
was invalid under the Condominium Ownership Act, which provides in pertinent part,
with our emphasis:
Subsequent to recording the declaration as provided in this act, and
while the property remains subject
to this act, DO lien shall thereafter
arise or be effective against the
property. .During such period hens
or encumbrances shall arise or be
created only against each unit....
Utah Code Ann. §57-8-19 (1953). The
Banks argue that Projects* hen arose and was
effective only after recordation of the condominium declaration. Thus, they argue, Projects was required to file a notice of hen for
each specific condominium unit.
Utah appellate courts have not had an
opportunity to interpret section 57-8-19 in
this context. However, both the Montana and
Wisconsin Supreme Courts have interpreted
statutes nearly identical to Utah's in contexts
similar to this case. See Hostetter v. Inland
Dev. Corp., 172 Mont. 167, 561 P.2d 1323
(1977); Stevens Const!. Corp. v. Draper Hall,
Inc., 73 Wis. 2d 104,242 N.W.2d 893 (1976).
The facts in Hostetter, Stevens, and the
instant case are essentially the same. In each
case, the developer contracted for the construction of condominium units and construction
work began. Thereafter, the developers filed
condominium declarations. Some time later.
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the contractors filed mechanic's hens which
described the entire property on which the
condominium complex was constructed and
failed to allocate separate amounts to the
different units. In each case, the defendants
argued that a blanket lien over the entire
project was inappropriate once the condominium declaration had been filed.
The courts in both Hostetter and Stevens
held that the blanket hen was sufficient. Hostetter, 172 Mont, at 173, 561 P.2d at 132627; Stevens, 73 Wis. 2d at 114, 242 N.W.2d at
898. Both courts noted that the key factor was
the point when the hens arose and became
effective against the property; both courts held
that this occurred at the commencement of
construction. Hostetter, 172 Mont, at 172-73,
561 P.2d at 1326; Stevens, 73 Wis. 2d at 114,
242 N.W.2d at 898. The filing of the hen
notice merely preserved and perfected the lien.
Srevens, 73 Wis. 2d at 114, 242 N.W.2d at
898. The only effect that the condominium
declaration had was to make the blanket lien
proportionately effective against each unit
constructed under the subject contract along
with its corresponding undivided interest in the
common area. Hostetter, 172 Mont, at 174,
561 P.2d at 1327; Srevens, 73 Wis. 2d at 114,
242N.W.2dat898.
The Banks attempt to distinguish Hostetter
and Stevens. They note that, unlike this case,
the work in those cases was done under a
single contract. They argue that this fact alone
should produce a different result, but they do
not state the reasons for their conclusion. We
have concluded that a hen notice may include
work performed under separate contracts and
fail to see why the result should be different
when the work is performed on a condominium project.12
We find the reasoning in Hostetter and
Stevens sound and adopt their rationale.
Section 57-6-19 does not affect the validity
of the hen in this case. The hen arose and
became effective when Projects commenced
work on the project. As previously noted, the
hen notice was sufficient to perfect that hen,
making the hen valid at least as to the units
properly subject to the hen and as between the
parties to this appeal. The only effect of
section 57-8-19 and the intermediate filing
of the declaration was to make the hen proportionately effective against each unit constructed under the subject contracts and each
such unit's corresponding undivided interest in
the common area. Having concluded that the
hen notice is not facially invalid as to the
Banks, we turn now to the separate arguments
presented by Valley Bank and Cottonwood
Thrift.
VI. VALLEY BANK DISMISSAL
The trial court granted summary judgment
to Valley Bank on the basis of Utah Code
Aim. f38-1-11 (1988). That starute prov-
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§78-40-2(1989), regardless of whether they
ides in pertinent part:
Actions to enforce (mechanic's]
I were named as parties or had actual knowledge of the action.
liens must be begun within twelve
Valley Bank's contrary interpretation would
months after the completion of the
render portions of the statute meaningless or
original contract, or the suspension
nonsensical. See Milieu v. Cltrk Clinic Corp.,
of work thereunder for a period of
609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980) ('[SJututory
thirty days. Within the twelve
enactments are to be so construed as to render
months herein mentioned the lien
all parts thereof relevant and meaningful, and
claimant shall file for record with
that interpretations are to be avoided which
the county recorder of each county
render some pan of a provision nonsensical or
in which the lien is recorded a
absurd. 9 ). For one thing, it would be pointless
notice of the pendency of the
to provide that a lien would be valid as against
action, in the manner provided in
persons with actual knowledge of the action to
actions affecting the title or right to
enforce the lien who had not been named as
possession of real property, or the
parties in the action as filed within the twelvehen shall be void, except as to
month period unless it were fully anticipated
persons who have been made parties
that such parties could be brought into the
to the action and persons having
action, by amendment, beyond the twelveactual knowledge of the commencmonth period. It would make no sense to
ement of the action....
consider the lien to be valid as against such
Id.
persons unless it could be enforced against
Projects commenced this action and reco- them by joining them in the action as previorded its lis pendens five months after it ceased usly commenced. Moreover, failure to join a
construction, well within the statutory twelve- defendant in the complaint as filed within the
month period. It did not, however, add Valley twelve-month period cannot be conclusively
Bank as a defendant until it filed its amended fatal to the claimant's ability to enforce the
complaint, nearly twenty months after const- hen as against the defendant or it would be
ruction ceased. Valley Bank argued, and the meaningless for the statute to refer to the
trial court agreed, that section 38-1-11 is a continued effectiveness of the hen, even absent
statute of limitation13 which required Projects timely recordation of a lis pendens, as against
to name Valley Bank as a defendant within the nonparties, like Valley Bank in this case, who
twelve-month period, on pain of its action have actual knowledge of the anion.
against Valley Bank being forever barred. We
We conclude that section 38-1-51 should
read section 38-1-11 differently.
be read as a whole to require a hen claimant
Section 38-1-11 has two requirements
to commence a mechanic's lien action and
which serve two different purposes. First, the
record a corresponding lis pendens within the
statute requires the lien claimant to commence
twelve-month period. Commencing the
his action within twelve months of the compaction preserves the lien. Recording the lis
letion of the project or suspension of work. See
pendens imparts constructive notice of the hen
supra note 13. Valley Bank argues that the
enforcement action to everyone interested in
lien claimant is also required by this provision
the liened property. Only when the claimant
to join all persons having an interest in the
fails to timely record the lis pendens can an
property within the twelve-month period.
interested person argue that it is not subject to
However, the statute does sot expressly
the lien, and then only if such person was not
require the hen claimant to do so and, on the
named as a party and did not have actual
contrary as hereafter explained, obviously
knowledge of the action.
contemplates the joinder of defendants not
In this case, Projects commenced the action
initially named after the expiration of the
and filed the lis pendens within the required
twelve-month period.
twelve-month period. Valley Bank was theThe second 'requirement* of section 38-1refore subject to the lien14 and could properly
11 is that the lien claimant file a lis pendens
be joined by an appropriate amendment to the
within the twelve-month period. However,
complaint as was done in this case. The trial
the limited effect of a failure to comply with
court accordingly erred when it dismissed
this requirement is expressly set forth in the
Valley Bank from the action.**
statute. When a claimant fails to file the lis
pendens within the twelve-month period, the
VH. AMBIGUITY OF 'PAKI1AL* U E N
lien itself is not invalidated, but rather it is
RELEASE
rendered void as to everyone except those
The trial court granted Cottonwood Thrift
named in the action and those with actual A Loan Company's summary judgment
knowledge of the action. By contrast, it motion on two grounds: First, the court confollows logically, timely recordation of the lis cluded that, 'based on undisputed f a c t s /
pendens imparts constructive notice to all Cottonwood Thrift had reasonably relied upon
persons concerned with the property of the the recorded lien release. Second, the court
action to enforce the lien, see Utah Code Ann. concluded that the effect of the release was
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dear on its face. Projects agues on appeal that antive rights of the purchaser ... [substantial] comthe release was ambiguous. It also argues that pliance is all that is necessary.* Id. at 1334.
reasonable reliance is a concept necessarily too 4. The current version of section 38-1-7 provides
in pertinent pan:
fact-sensitive for disposition by summary
(2) This notice shall contain a statement
judgment.
setting forth the following information:
Whether a contract is ambiguous is a ques(a) the name of the reputed
tion of law. E.g., Morris v. Mountain States
owner if known or, if not known,
Tel. & Tel Co.. 658 P.2d 1199, 1200 (Utah
the name of the record owner;
1983). Moreover, the trial court must deter(b) the name of the person
mine 'whether a contract is ambiguous ...
by whom he was employed or to
before it takes any evidence in clarification. * Id.
whom he furnished the equipment
or material;
It follows, therefore, that if the contract is
(c) the time when the first
clear on its face, the trial court need not-and last labor or service was
and in fact should not-consider evidence of
performed or the first and last
a contrary meaning.
equipment or material was furnThe release in this case stated in pertinent
ished;
part that Projects "in consideration of
(d) a description of the pro[S90,000] ... does hereby release, satisfy and
perty, sufficient for identificadischarge that certain claim of lien ... against
tion; and
the following described real property/ The
(e) the signature of the lien
claimant or his authorized agent
release then described units 4 and 5. This
and an acknowledgment or certlanguage is susceptible of no other interpretificate ....
ation but that the two units were completely
released from the scope of the lien.M The trial Utah Code Ann. §38-1-7 (Supp. 1990). Requircourt properly construed the release as a ements under the 1984 version of this provision
matter of law and properly declined to cons- which are no longer pan of the statute include
ider evidence of another intent. Consequently, actual verification of the statements in the lien
notice, "a statement of (the claimant's) demand
we affirm the trial court's decision to dismiss after deducting all just credits and offsets ... (, and]
17
Cottonwood Thrift from the action.
a statement of the terms, time given and conditions
of his contract ....* Utah Code Ann. §38-1-7
vni. CONCLUSION
(Supp. 1983).
The trial court's order and judgment of 5. It is important to emphasize the scope of this
dismissal are affirmed only as they relate to opinion. Our focus is of course upon the particular
Cottonwood Thrift.11 As to Copper State and parties and particular facts in this case, but it is
Valley Bank, we reverse and remand for trial further narrowed by the "as a matter of law" stanor other appropriate proceedings consistent dard implicit in reviewing summary judgments. It
may well be that the same lien notices would have
with this decision.
worked significant prejudice on other parties not
before us, such as owners of, or lenders secured by,
WE CONCUR:
the phase II parcel to which Projects had no valid
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice
daim. Thus it is entirely possible that we would
Richard C. Howe, Associate Chief Justice
invalidate this same notice as it applied to another
1. Daniel Stewart, Justice
party who could demonstrate prejudice. Cf. HorseMichael D. Zimmerman, Justice
shoe Estates v. 2M Co., 713 PJd 776, 781 (Wyo.
1986) (holding lien sufficient as against party who
Durham, Justice, having disqualified
failed to demonstrate prejudice or that it was
herself, does not participate herein; Gregory
misled). It is even conceivable that the Banks, or
K. Orme, Court of Appeals Judge, sat.
some of them, could demonstrate actual prejudice in
the context of a trial. At this juncture, however, we
1. Accordingly, the metes and bounds description only consider the Banks* contention that the hens
was not confined to the property on which the eight are soflawedas to simply be void, regardless of any
units constructed by Projects were located. actual prejudice.
However, it appears from the record that the only 6. Section 38-1-7 has been amended since 1983. See
new structures on any part of the Highland Orch- supra note 4.
ards property were the units constructed by Proj- 7. In First Security Mortgage, a lien notice was held
ects.
invalid because the hen claimant failed to sign the
2. The Banks do not argue that Projects completely oath. The notice was insufficient even though the
failed to comply with any of the particular require- notary had signed the certificate. See also Worthiments of Utah Code Ann. §38-1-7 (1983). ngtoo 4 Kimball Constr. Co. y. C it A Dev. Co.,
Rather, they argue that Projects' efforts did not 777 PM 475 (Utah 1989).
substantially comply with the statutes.
I. In 1989, the legislature amended the mechanic's
J. This trend is not confined to this area of the law ben statute to specifically provide a particular jurat
but can be seen in others as well. See, e.g., Tech- form. The current statute requires *an acknowledFluid Servs., inc. v. Oavilan Operating, Inc., 787 gment or certificate as required under Chapter 3,
PJd 1328 (Utah a . App. 1990). In Tccb-Fluid, Title 5 7 / Utah Code Ann. |38-l-7(2)(e) (Supp.
the Utah Court of Appeals took a similar position 1990).
in the area of redemption. The court concluded that 9. We recognize that this conclusion is inconsistent
where the provisions in the redemption statute are with ID re Williamson, 43 Bankr. 813 (D. Utah
'procedural in nature and do not affect any substVTAHADVA CE1EPORTS
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J984), on which the thai court heavily relied. ID
Willi Am son, the bankruptcy court found that each
dement listed in section 46-1-6 was an essential
pan of a notary's certificate even when made on a
mechanic's lien. Id. at 823. Utah law was admittedly unclear on this point when Williamson was
decided. Nonetheless, we disagree with the analysis
in Williamson and hold to the contrary.
10. It is not enough for the Banks to show that
other persons might have been prejudiced by the lien
notice. In order to prevail, the Banks must show
that they were somehow misled or prejudiced. See
supra note 5.
11. At the risk of unnecessary repetition, we reiterate that in holding that the description does not
invalidate the hen as to the Banks, we do not mean
to suggest that the result would be the same for
others. The lien, for example, is ineffective as to the
phase II property, in which the Banks claim no
interest, and inclusion of that property in the lien
notices would subject Projects to appropriate relief
in a slander of title action. See supra note 5.
12 In Hostetter, the Montana court specifically
noted that the blanket hen was effective against the
entire condominium project because 'the work was
performed under one contract, and not a series of
separate contracts for each unit.* Hostetter v.
Inland Dev. Corp., 172 Mont. 167, 170, 561 P.2d
1323, 1325 (1977). Apparently, Montana courts have
adopted the position that a single hen may not
encompass work performed under multiple contracts. See Caird Eng'g Works v. Seven-up Gold
Mining Co., Ill Mont. 471, 4*7-89, 111 P.2d 267,
276 (1941). We have declined to adopt that position
and thus disavow that aspect of the Hostetter decision.
13. Although both parties have characterized section
38-1-11 as a statute of limitation, we do not view
it strictly as such. Rather, it contains one of the
requirements with which the claimant must comply
'before (that] party is entitled to the benefits created
by the (mechanic's lien] statute." AAA Fencing Co.
v. Raintree Dev. A Energy Co.% 714 P.2d 289, 291
(Utah 1986). The penalty for not commencing an
action to enforce a mechanic's lien within the twelvemonth period provided in section 38-1-11 is invalidation of the lien rather than preclusion of the
claim as with a traditional statute of limitation. See,
e.g., Utah Code Ann. §78-12-23 (Supp. 1986).
The commencement requirement of section 38-111 serves as a substantive restriction on the lien
action and, unlike a true statute of limitation, is not
waived if not pleaded. AAA, 714 P M at 291.
14. It is worth noting that even if Projects had not
recorded its lis pendens timely, Valley Bank would
still be subject to the lien because it had actual
knowledge of Projects* action by no later than
August 1984, when it reviewed a title report disclosing the action and commenced a dialogue with
Projects coiscerning the matter.
15. Although Valley Bank directs our attention to
California and Illinois decisions holding that a lien
claimant may in no event add defendants after
expiration of the dealine for filing a mechanic's lien
action, we art not persuaded by those decisions. As
previously noted, unlike California and Illinois statutes, section 3*-1-11 is sot a true statute of
limitation. See supra note 13. Moreover, our statute
is significantly different from the statutes in California and Illinois because it does not merely impose
a dealine for commencement of the action, but goes
on to delineate persons who will be subject to the
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ben even though not joined in the action within the
twelve-month period. Our attention is drawn to no
decision construing similar language in any otheT
mechanic's
16. Projects argues that the release was ambiguous
because the word 'Partial* was added to the
'Release of Uen" beading. However, in the context
of this case, the release clearly was 'partial * because
it only released two of the eight units otherwise
covered by the lien notice. We do not believe that
the addition created any ambiguity in the instrument.
In the determination of the real character of a contract, courts will always
look to its purpose rather than to the
name given it by the parties, and where
a conflict exists between a name attempted to be applied to a particular contract and the language of the contract
itself, the name will be rejected as inapplicable.
17 Am. Jur. 2d Contracts §269 (1964) (footnote
omitted).
17. Because we agree that the release was clear and
was not ambiguous, we need not address Projects'
reasonable reliance arguments.
18. The Banks request on appeal that we award
attorney fees based upon Utah Code Ann. §38-118 (1988), which provides: 'In any action brought to
enforce any lien under this chapter the successful
party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be
taxed as costs in the action." In view of our
holding, except as concerns Cottonwood Thrift,
determination of any party's 'success" is clearly
premature. In the case of Cottonwood Thrift, we
note that h, along with the other banks, did not
request attorney fees as part of its motion for
summary judgment. We will not entertain issues
raised for the first time on appeal. Zions First Nat'l
Bank v. National Am. Title ins. Co., 749 P-2d 651,
657 (Utah 1988). Therefore, we decline to consider
Cottonwood Thrift's request for fees even though it
has successfully defeated Projects' claims against it.
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